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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Did the Third District Court err in ordering a new sale of 
the SAIC Barn free and clear of all liens, interests, and 
encumbrances? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is clearly 
stated in the unambiguous language of Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a). That rule provides: "Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The 
decision of In re Infant Anonymous cited by Appellant does not 
govern this appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-314: 
Unless the court orders otherwise, the liquidator 
has the following powers and responsibilities: 
. . . . 
(9) He may acquire, hypothecate, encumber, lease, 
improve, sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of or 
deal with any property of the insurer at its market 
value or upon fair and reasonable terms and conditions, 
except that no transaction involving property with a 
market value exceeding $25,000 may be concluded without 
the express permission of the court. 
(23) He may exercise all the powers conferred upon 
receivers by the laws of this state which are not 
inconsistent with this chapter. 
1 
2. Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 (1)(a) 
and (b): 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All 
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall 
be accompanied by a memorandum of points and 
authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or 
citations by page number to relevant portions of 
depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in 
support of the motion. . . . 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The 
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties 
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum 
in opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation. . . . 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Southern American Insurance Company ("SAIC") was placed into 
liquidation in March of 1992 by order of the Third District Court 
(the "Third District Court"). The Utah Insurance Commissioner 
was appointed at that time as the statutory liquidator of SAIC 
(the "Liquidator"). As part of the Liquidator's statutory duties 
and responsibilities, the Liquidator is authorized to "exercise 
all the powers conferred upon receivers by the laws of this 
state" under the supervision of the Third District Court pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-314 (23). 
One of the Liquidator's responsibilities is to liquidate 
SAIC's assets. The Utah Insurance Code requires the Liquidator 
to obtain the Third District Court's approval for the sale of 
assets with a market value exceeding $25,000. Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-27-314 (9). One of those assets is the former headquarters 
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building of SAIC (a converted dairy barn) commonly known as the 
"SAIC Barn". 
In February of 1994, Appellant Golfland Entertainment 
Centers, Inc. ("Golfland") submitted an oral offer for the 
purchase of the SAIC Barn, which oral offer extended to the 
purchase of two adjacent properties, a water park and a storage 
shed, which were under the jurisdiction of the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (the "Bankruptcy 
Court"). The three properties were being sold together, and the 
sellers required simultaneous closing of all three properties. 
The Third District Court entered an order of February 24, 1994 
(the "1994 Order"), approving Golfland's purchase of the SAIC 
Barn, but subject to the terms and conditions submitted to the 
Third District Court. The Bankruptcy Court initially approved 
Golfland's purchase of the water park and the storage shed on 
February 23, 1994. However, the Bankruptcy Court later rescinded 
its approval of the sale of the water park, and eventually 
approved a sale of the water park to another buyer. 
The agreement for the purchase of the SAIC Barn required the 
closing on all three properties to occur by April 8, 1994. 
However, because the Bankruptcy Court had rescinded its approval 
of the sale of the water park and because other conditions 
precedent for the sale to be consummated were not satisfied, the 
closing did not occur by that deadline. 
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Thereafter, the Liquidator received an offer from Provo City 
to purchase the SAIC Barn. The Liquidator then filed his "Motion 
for Supplemental Order Approving Sale of Southern American 
Insurance Company Headquarters Building Free and Clear of Liens, 
Interests and Encumbrances" (the "Liquidator's Motion") on August 
12, 1994, seeking either the Third District Court's authorization 
to sell the SAIC Barn to Provo City, or alternatively, requesting 
the Third District Court to set the terms of any sale of the SAIC 
Barn to Golfland if the Third District Court determined that the 
Liquidator was still obligated to sell to Golfland. Golfland 
objected and filed several memoranda with attached documentation 
in support of its objection. Golfland requested oral argument 
but did not request an evidentiary hearing in its memoranda. 
After oral argument on April 17, 1995, the Third District 
Court ruled that the Liquidator was not required to sell the SAIC 
Barn to Golfland, nor did it approve the Liquidator's request to 
sell the SAIC Barn to Provo City. Instead, the Third District 
Court exercised its discretion as the supervising Court for the 
SAIC liquidation by ordering the Liquidator to sell the SAIC Barn 
at a new auction to the highest bidder free and clear of all 
liens, interests, and encumbrances, with Golfland being allowed 
to participate in the new auction. The Third District Court's 
order reflecting its ruling was entered on July 11, 1995 (the 
"1995 Order"). Golfland has appealed the 1995 Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
4 
Golfland7s Offer to Purchase the SAIC Barn. 
1. Golfland was the high bidder at a February 22, 1994 
oral auction for the purchase of the SAIC Barn, the Seven Peaks 
Water Park (the "Water Park") owned by BCD Corporation (which was 
in bankruptcy), and an adjacent storage shed facility owned by 
CDX Corporation (also in bankruptcy) (the "Storage Shed"). R. 
1855. (All references to the Record are cited as "R. " ) . 
Golfland submitted a single combined bid for the three properties 
of $2,610,000, allocated as follows: $2,200,000 for the Water 
Park, $360,000 for the SAIC Barn, and $50,000 for the CDX Storage 
Shed. R. 1989. 
2. Golfland's oral offer to purchase the SAIC Barn and the 
other two properties adopted the terms of a previous offer 
submitted by B&B Properties Company, L.C. ("B&B"),1 except that 
Golfland waived all of the conditions to closing contained in the 
*In the fall of 1993, the Liquidator received and accepted, 
subject to the Third District Court's approval and to higher and 
better offers, an offer (the "B & B Offer") from B & B to 
purchase the SAIC Barn for $200,000 in conjunction with the sale 
of the Water Park and Storage Shed. The sale of the Water Park 
and Storage Shed were subject to the approval of the Bankruptcy 
Court. The terms of the B & B Offer were contained in the "Offer 
to Purchase and Sale and Purchase Agreement and Closing 
Instructions Relating Thereto", the "Extension and Amendment of 
Offer", the "Acceptance of Offer as Modified and Counteroffer", 
and the "Acceptance of Counteroffer and Counter-Counteroffer". 
(R. 1249-1271.) The Liquidator subsequently received several 
higher and better offers for the Water Park, the SAIC Barn, and 
the CDX Storage Shed, and an oral auction of the three properties 
was conducted on February 22, 1994. R. 1854. 
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B & B Offer other than title insurance, and Golfland also agreed 
to "close" in two weeks from the date of the auction. R. 1794. 
3. Golfland's offer adopted the provisions of the B&B 
Offer, which reflected that the SAIC Barn had to be sold in 
conjunction with the sale of the Water Park and the CDX Storage 
Shed. R. 1254, 1267, 1794. 
4. The B&B offer adopted by Golfland further stated that 
the deadline for closing the sale of the SAIC Barn was April 8, 
1994, and outlined the following course of action if the sale of 
the SAIC Barn failed to close by that deadline: 
[P]rovided further that unless the Closing shall occur 
on or before one hundred and twenty (120) days after 
the later of the dates appearing next to the signatures 
of Seller and Buyer on this Agreement, the Title 
Company Account shall terminate without further acts of 
the parties hereto, and in such event the Title Company 
shall, except as otherwise expressly provided in 
Paragraph 10 hereof, return all documents and funds 
deposited pursuant hereto to the parties depositing the 
same and neither party shall have any further liability 
to the other hereunder, except as otherwise expressly 
provided in said Paragraph 10 hereof. 
R. 1264-1265. 
5. Following the February 22, 1994 auction, the Third 
District Court entered its "Order Approving Sale of Property of 
the Liquidation Estate Free and Clear of Liens, Interests and 
Encumbrances" on February 24, 1994 (the "1994 Order"). R. 1539-
1542. 
6. A hearing was held before the Bankruptcy Court on 
February 23, 1994, seeking Bankruptcy Court approval of the sale 
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of the Water Park and the Storage Shed to Golfland, consistent 
with the requirement in the Golfland offer that these two 
properties be sold simultaneously with the SAIC Barn. R. 1796-
1797. The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of the Water Park 
and the Storage Shed to Golfland at that hearing, and written 
orders approving the sale were entered by the Bankruptcy Court on 
March 31, 1994. R. 1796-1797. A second bidder at the February 
22, 1994 auction, Peak Investments Incorporated ("Peak") was 
approved by the Bankruptcy Court as a back-up purchaser of the 
Water Park and the Storage Shed. R. 1796-1797. 
The Failed Sale of the SAIC Barn. 
7. Following the entry of the 1994 Order, disputes arose 
between the Liquidator and Golfland concerning their respective 
obligations to each other with respect to the sale of the SAIC 
Barn. R. 1797, 1942. 
8. In particular, questions arose as to whether an 
underground storage tank still existed on the SAIC Barn property, 
and whether there had been petroleum contamination from that 
underground storage tank. R. 2064. Golfland asserted that even 
though it had waived the conditions to closing contained in the 
B & B offer it adopted, including the right to receive and 
approve an environmental assessment report of the SAIC Barn, it 
had not waived its right to insist that the Liquidator give to 
Golfland at closing the environmental warranties originally 
required by B & B in its offer. R. 2063, 2640. 
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9. The Liquidator asserted that the waiver of the 
condition of closing relating to the environmental issues also 
constituted a waiver of the environmental warranty and that the 
risk of any environmental problems had been assumed by Golfland. 
R. 2063, 2640. Golfland demanded that the Liquidator provide the 
environmental warranty and insisted that it had not waived this 
requirement at the auction. R. 2063, 2640. 
10. As a result of Golfland's demand, the parties 
eventually agreed to cap any potential liability of the SAIC 
estate associated with any environmental warranty for the SAIC 
Barn at $200,000. R. 2605, 1795. 
11. On March 8, 1994, Golfland deposited the sum of 
$360,000 (along with other funds for the purchase of the Water 
Park and the CDX Storage Shed, totalling $2,610,000) with 
Security Title and Abstract Company (the "Title Company") for the 
purchase of the SAIC Barn, subject to Golfland/s sole discretion 
as to the disposition of the funds. R. 1934. 
12. On April 7, 1994, Peak filed with the Bankruptcy Court 
a "Motion to Enforce Sale to Alternative Bidder and 
Motion for Stay" (the "Peak Motion for Stay"), seeking a stay of 
the Bankruptcy Court's Order authorizing the sale of the Water 
Park to Golfland. R. 1800. 
13. Peak contended that Golfland had failed to meet the 
requirements set forth in the Bankruptcy Court's Order 
authorizing the sale of the Water Park, and that the terms and 
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conditions of the sale of the Water Park to Golfland were a major 
modification from those authorized by the Bankruptcy Court. 
R. 2070. 
14. Because of the filing of Peak's Motion for Stay, the 
Title Company declined to issue to Golfland a title insurance 
policy on the Water Park, which was a condition precedent to 
closing the sale of the Water Park which only Golfland could 
waive. R. 2071, 1801. Golfland declined to waive that condition 
precedent for its protection; accordingly, the sale of the SAIC 
Barn to Golfland did not close by April 8, 1994, R. 1801, as 
required by the B&B offer adopted by Golfland. R. 1264-1265. 
Peak's Motion to Stay is Granted. 
15. During the Bankruptcy Court proceedings, John Kenney, 
Golfland's representative at the auction, testified that he 
understood that the effect of waiving the conditions to closing, 
including the environmental report, was to subject Golfland to 
paying the costs associated with environmental problems. R. 
1953. This statement was contrary to Golfland's post-auction 
assertions to the Liquidator when negotiating concessions 
concerning potential environmental problems. R. 2063. 
16. On June 6, 1994, following a four day evidentiary 
hearing, and after weighing the testimony, the Bankruptcy Court 
found that all bidders at the February 22, 1994 auction "believed 
that the risk of environmental problems on the property being 
purchased was thereby shifted to the buyer," and that the final 
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terms of the sale of the Water Park to Golfland were not the sale 
terms approved by the Bankruptcy Court. R. 2605-2606. The 
Bankruptcy Court found that this agreement was a major change in 
the terms of the sale. R. 2607. The Bankruptcy Court also found 
that fl[t]he terms that the parties thought they were bargaining 
on and bidding on turn out not to be the terms of the sale which 
is ultimately proposed to the court." R. 2606. The Bankruptcy 
Court held that the sale to Golfland was not authorized. R. 
2608. The Bankruptcy Court ordered the owner of the Water Park 
not to proceed with a final sale of the Water Park without 
further order of the Bankruptcy Court. R. 2608. A copy of the 
Bankruptcy Court ruling is attached hereto in the Addendum at 
Exhibit "C." 
17. On July 6, 1994, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order 
(the "1994 Bankruptcy Order") formally setting aside its March 
31, 1994 Order authorizing the sale of the Water Park to 
Golfland. R. 1957-1959. A copy of the 1994 Bankruptcy Order is 
attached hereto in the Addendum at Exhibit "C." 
18. The Liquidator subsequently received an offer from 
Provo City to purchase the SAIC Barn for $395,000. R. 1863-1865. 
19. On August 11, 1994, Golfland filed a Motion for Leave 
to File Complaint Against Liquidation Estate (the "Golfland 
Motion") and a supporting memorandum with the Third District 
Court. R. 1779-1814. 
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20. On August 12, 1994, the Liquidator filed "Liquidator's 
Motion for Supplemental Order Approving Sale of Southern American 
Insurance Company Headquarters Building Free and Clear of Liens, 
Interests and Encumbrances11 (the "Liquidator's Motion") . R. 
1815-1818. The Liquidator's Motion requested that the Third 
District Court authorize the sale of the SAIC Barn to Provo City 
because the conditions precedent relating to the sale of the SAIC 
Barn to Golfland had failed, or alternatively, that the Third 
District Court set the terms of the sale of the SAIC Barn to 
Golfland if the Third District Court determined that the 
Liquidator was still obligated to Golfland. R. 1815-1818. 
21. The Liquidator and Golfland argued their respective 
motions before the Third District Court on April 17, 1995. 
R. 3131. After consideration of the parties' extensive briefs, 
the documentary evidence submitted by both parties, and the oral 
arguments of counsel, the Third District Court ordered the 
Liquidator not to sell to either Provo City or Golfland, but 
rather, to sell the SAIC Barn at a new auction to the highest 
bidder. R. 3133. The Third District Court also granted the 
Golfland Motion.2 R. 2977. 
20n June 22, 1995, Golfland filed a complaint against the 
Liquidator in the Third District Court (the "Golfland 
Complaint"). The Liquidator has filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
Golfland Complaint, which remains pending before the Third 
District Court. 
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22. The Liquidator subsequently prepared his proposed Order 
Approving Sale of Southern American Insurance Company 
Headquarters Building Free and Clear of Liens, Interests and 
Encumbrances (the "Proposed Order"). R. 2938-2944. On May 5, 
1995, Golfland filed an objection to the Proposed Order, 
including an argument that evidence was taken at the hearing. 
R. 2933-2937. Documentary evidence was submitted by both 
Golfland and the Liquidator with the pleadings. R. 1835-1862; 
1922-1956; 2055-2075; 2600-2644. 
23. On July 7, 1995, the Third District Court entered its 
Order Approving Sale of Southern American Insurance Company 
Headquarters Building Free and Clear of Liens, Interests and 
Encumbrances (the "1995 Order"), R. 3131-3136, finding that: 
a. The sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland was 
contingent upon conditions which never occurred. 
R. 3132, 5 2. 
b. Golfland7s alleged tender of the purchase funds 
did not amount to a proper tender with respect to 
the closing. R. 3132, 5 3. 
c. The closing of the sale of the SAIC Barn did not 
occur in a timely fashion. R. 3132, 5 4. 
d. The condition precedent that the SAIC Barn 
simultaneously close with the sale of the Water 
Park was frustrated by the Bankruptcy Court's July 
6, 1994 order; thus there was no binding agreement 
between the Liquidator and Golfland for the sale 
of the SAIC Barn. R. 3132, 5 5. 
e. Judge Stirba's February 24, 1994 order authorizing 
the sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland was 
"ineffective" because the terms of the Original 
Barn Sale Order were different than the terms of 
12 
the Golfland offer that was frustrated by the 
Bankruptcy Court. R. 3133, f 6. 
f• Specific performance was not an available remedy 
because the SAIC Barn was not "unique." R. 3133, 
1 7. 
24. On July 28, 1995, Golfland filed a Notice of Appeal of 
the 1995 Order. R. 3263-3271. Golfland's initial appeal was 
assigned to this Court under Court of Appeals No. 960419. On 
December 27, 1996, this Court dismissed Golfland's original 
appeal for lack of finality. R. 5157-5162. On July 22, 1997, 
the Third District Court certified the 1995 Order as a final 
order. R. 6316-6319. Golfland filed its second Notice of Appeal 
on August 20, 1997. R. 6307-6309. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Third District Court correctly ordered the Liquidator to 
sell the SAIC Barn at a new auction. The Third District Court 
properly ruled that the terms for the sale of the SAIC Barn to 
Golfland under the 1994 Order had not been met because the 
contingencies for the sale never occurred. It is beyond dispute 
that the Bankruptcy Court withdrew approval for the sale of the 
Water Park, which was a condition precedent for the simultaneous 
sale of the SAIC Barn. The Bankruptcy Court's order has been 
affirmed by the Federal District Court (twice) and by the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Golfland cannot change history. 
Moreover, Golfland is collaterally estopped from relitigating in 
the Third District Court the dispute over whether or not the 
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Bankruptcy Court should have ordered the sale of the Water Park 
to Golfland. The Third District Court properly ordered the 
Liquidator to hold a new auction for the SAIC Barn. 
The Third District Court did not commit any procedural 
errors and did not deprive Golfland of any procedural rights. 
The Third District Court did not err in finding that documentary 
evidence was submitted to it in accordance with the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. The Third District Court also did not 
err by not holding an evidentiary hearing after Golfland failed 
to timely request such a hearing. Moreover, the Third District 
Court provided a forum for Golfland's grievances by granting 
leave for Golfland to file a complaint against the Liquidator .if 
Golfland could prove any damages against the Liquidator. 
Golfland cannot litigate in this appeal issues which are still 
pending before the Third District Court in that lawsuit. 
Golfland also waived any alleged procedural errors. 
Golfland acquiesced in the submission of documentary evidence and 
itself submitted documentary evidence to the Third District 
Court. Golfland also did not object to any of the documentary 
evidence offered by both the Liquidator and Golfland. Finally, 
the 1995 Order is not internally inconsistent or otherwise 
defective, and is fully supported by the record. This Court 
should affirm the 1995 Order. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE TERMS OP 
THE ORIGINAL SALES AGREEMENT WERE NOT MET BECAUSE THE 
CONTINGENCIES FOR THE SALE NEVER OCCURRED. 
The Third District Court found that the sale of the SAIC 
Barn to Golfland was contingent upon conditions which never 
occurred, including the sale of the SAIC Barn in a timely 
fashion, and that the condition precedent that the SAIC Barn 
simultaneously close with the sale of the Water Park was 
frustrated by the Bankruptcy Court's order withdrawing approval 
of the sale of the Water Park to Golfland, thus resulting in no 
binding agreement between the Liquidator and Golfland for the 
sale of the SAIC Barn. These findings of fact are fully 
supported by the evidence before the Third District Court, and 
they are not clearly erroneous.3 Furthermore, these findings 
alone are sufficient to affirm the Third District Court's ruling. 
A. The Evidence Before the Third District Court Supported 
Its Finding That the Bankruptcy Court Withdrew Approval 
for the Sale of the Water Park, Thereby Frustrating the 
Sale of the SAIC Barn. 
The Third District Court ordered a new auction of the SAIC 
Barn because the contingencies for the sale of the SAIC Barn to 
Golfland did not occur. Although Golfland now belatedly regrets 
3
 Instead of attacking these findings as clearly erroneous, 
Golfland instead argues that these findings are mere "dicta" and 
should be ignored. Brief of Appellant ("Golfland Brief") at p. 
21. It is clear that these findings are not dicta but are the 
central focus of the 1995 Order. Golfland obviously hopes to 
downplay these findings because they are so damaging to Golfland. 
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that it agreed to these two contingencies, Golfland concedes, as 
it must do, that these contingencies existed and that they did 
not occur. Golfland Brief at p. 35. Moreover, Golfland must 
concede that these two contingencies will never occur, no matter 
how many evidentiary hearings Golfland is given on these issues. 
Although Golfland has argued that the Third District Court's 
failure to give it an evidentiary hearing, such an evidentiary 
would have been futile, because an evidentiary hearing cannot 
change historical events (evidenced by documentary evidence 
submitted to the Third District Court) which cannot be reversed 
or changed. 
The Third District Court was apprised by both Golfland and 
the Liquidator through documentary evidence that the 
contingencies of Bankruptcy Court approval and a simultaneous 
sale had failed. Notwithstanding Golfland's complaints about 
"procedural irregularities," Golfland admits that Bankruptcy 
Court approval was withdrawn and that the Third District Court 
was advised of that undisputed fact. The Bankruptcy Court's 
ruling was presented to the Third District Court, which properly 
took judicial notice of that ruling as a basis for its own ruling 
that the sale of the SAIC Barn was "contingent upon conditions 
which never occurred." R. 3132. Golfland grudgingly concedes 
that "on its face, the language of this factual finding is not 
erroneous." Golfland Brief at p. 35. 
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B. The Bankruptcy Court's Order Rescinding Approval of the 
Sale of the Water Park to Golfland Has Been Affirmed By 
the Federal District Court and the Tenth Circuit, 
Golfland's plea for an evidentiary hearing is futile. The 
Bankruptcy Court's ruling withdrawing approval of the sale of the 
Water Park to Golfland has now been affirmed twice by the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah (the "Federal 
District Court") and once by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Golfland's attempt to reinstate the Bankruptcy Court's approval 
through its federal appeals has failed. 
Golfland's first appeal in the federal system was assigned 
to Chief Judge David Sam of the Federal District Court. On 
September 19, 1995, Judge Sam affirmed the 1994 Bankruptcy Court 
Order as follows: 
The court finds that the bankruptcy court's ruling 
that the sale should be set aside is not an abuse of 
discretion. The bankruptcy court found that there was 
a mistake in the sale sufficient to justify setting 
aside the sale because "[e]veryone at the auction 
believed that the risk of environmental problems on the 
property being purchased was shifted to the buyer." 
This factual finding is supported by sufficient 
evidence in the record, and the court's finding that 
this misunderstanding is a mistake as to a material 
term of the sale appears correct. Such a mistake would 
indicate that the bidders did not have a fair 
opportunity to bid at the sale, and mistakes which 
affect the fairness of the bidding process are the type 
which would ordinarily be seen as sufficient to justify 
setting aside a confirmed sale. 
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In re BCD Corp, (Golfland Entertainment Centers. Inc, v. Peak 
Investment. Inc. and BCD Corp,), No. 94-C-0329-S (DU, September 
19, 1995).4 
Golfland next appealed to the Tenth Circuit. On July 21, 
1997, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court and the 
Federal District Court. In re BCD Corporation (Golfland 
Entertainment Centers. Inc. v. Peak Investment. Inc.). 119 F.3d 
852 (10th Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit ruled as follows: 
Under this standard we are convinced that the 
bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in 
setting aside the original sale when it concluded that 
the confirmation had been granted through a mistake as 
to the terms of the sale. The bankruptcy court found 
that initially everyone present at the bidding 
"believed that the risk of environmental problems on 
the property being purchased was thereby shifted to the 
buyer." However, the sellers and Golfland disagreed as 
to the terms of the sale, in particular whether 
Golfland had assumed the risk of environmental 
remediation. The parties then agreed that the sellers 
would assume the risk of the first $200,000 in 
environmental liability and half of a $33,000 bond that 
had been filed to meet municipal requirements. As a 
result, the bankruptcy court found that "[t]he terms 
that the parties thought they were bargaining and 
bidding on turn out not to be the terms of the sale 
which is ultimately proposed to the court." 
Id. at 860-61 (record citations omitted). 
Although the court's findings could have been stated 
more clearly, we read the court as having found that 
4
 A copy of Judge Sam's 9/19/95 Order is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A." The Liquidator has cited and attached copies of 
Chief Judge Sam's unpublished decision and the unpublished 
decision of Judge Kimball attached hereto as Exhibit "B" in 
accordance with the Federal District Court's Local Rule DUCiv R 
7-2(a). 
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Golfland and BCD as the seller had never actually 
agreed upon the terms of the sale, specifically with 
regard to the environmental warranty provisions. 
Id. at 861. 
We are convinced, based on all the evidence, that 
the bankruptcy court's factual finding that there never 
were agreed-upon terms for the sale of the water park 
was not clearly erroneous. Furthermore, the bankruptcy 
court's decision to set aside the confirmed sale on the 
ground that it had been entered under a mistake as to 
the terms of the agreement was not an abuse of 
discretion. . . . 
Golfland's other challenges to the decisions of 
the bankruptcy court and the district court are that 
the factual finding that Golfland waived the 
environmental warranties was clearly erroneous and 
that, even assuming that Golfland had changed the terms 
of the sale, the proper remedy would have been to allow 
the sale to go forward under the original terms 
presented to the bankruptcy court. 
We have considered these arguments and are not 
persuaded that it was error or an abuse of discretion 
to set aside the sale. The argument regarding whether 
Golfland had waived the environmental warranties is 
irrelevant, given the finding, which we uphold, that 
there had not been an agreement as to the terms of the 
sale. Similarly the bankruptcy court could not enforce 
the original terms of the sale because there had been 
no agreement as to the original terms . . . . 
Id. at 861-62. 
Prior to the Tenth Circuit's ruling, Golfland had filed a 
Proof of Claim in the BCD bankruptcy case for its alleged damages 
arising from BCD's failure to sell the Water Park to Golfland. 
After the Tenth Circuit ruled, the Bankruptcy Court disallowed 
Golfland's Proof of Claim. Golfland again appealed to the 
Federal District Court, and its second appeal was assigned to 
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Federal District Judge Dale Kimball. On June 4, 1998, Judge 
Kimball affirmed the Bankruptcy Court, ruling as follows: 
In BCD Corporation v. Peak Investment. Inc., 119 
F.3d 852 (1997) the Tenth Circuit held that it was not 
error or an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
Bankruptcy Court to set aside the sale of the water 
park to Golfland. The Tenth Circuit further held that 
there had not been an agreement as to the terms of the 
sale and "the bankruptcy court could not enforce the 
original terms of the sale because there had been no 
agreement as to the original terms. . . . " Id. at 862. 
In other words, the Tenth Circuit's ruling makes it 
clear that no contract existed between Golfland and BCD 
Corporation. Even though Golfland's Proof of Claim was 
not brought in the identical case that was appealed to 
the Tenth Circuit, it is clear to this court that all 
claims brought in the Proof of Claim are untenable 
based upon the umbrella of the Tenth Circuit's ruling 
and the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the final sale 
for $3,600,000.00 to a third party. All of Golfland's 
claims against BCD flow from the failure to perform 
under the February Contract. The Tenth Circuit has 
ruled that there was no meeting of the minds as to the 
February Contract and therefore no contract existed. 
If there was no contract, Golfland does not have a 
remedy at law. Although this may not be exactly the 
kind of case that the "law of the case" doctrine 
typically applies to, this court cannot reverse the 
Tenth Circuit's ruling that there was no contract 
between the parties which is what would have to be done 
in order for the appellant to have a cause of action. 
In re BCD Corporation (Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. v. 
BCD Corporation and Southern American Insurance Company), No. 
2:97 CV 953K (DU, June 4, 1998).5 
The evidentiary hearing demanded by Golfland could never 
change the fact that there was no Bankruptcy Court approval and 
5
 A copy of Judge Kimball's 6/4/98 Order is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "B" in accordance with the Federal District Court's 
Local Rule DUCiv R 7-2(a). 
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no simultaneous sale, and no possibility of reinstating either of 
those contingencies. The undisputed facts that the Bankruptcy 
Court withdrew its approval of the sale of the Water Park and 
that the sale of the SAIC Barn did not occur simultaneously with 
the sale of the Water Park and the Storage Shed, coupled with the 
federal system/s final affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court's 
actions, obviate the need for any further litigation or evidence 
on these historical facts. 
C. Collateral Estoppel Bars Golfland From Relitigatincr 
Issues In a Jury Trial Before the Third District Court 
That Have Been Conclusively Decided by the Bankruptcy 
Court and Affirmed by the Federal District Court and 
the Tenth Circuit. 
Recognizing that it cannot change history, or change the 
rulings of three federal courts, Golfland now relies upon two 
arguments for asserting that Golfland is entitled to a jury trial 
to prove that the Liquidator is still contractually obligated to 
sell the SAIC Barn to Golfland. Golfland argues: (1) "a party 
who is responsible for the failure of a condition [precedent] may 
not escape liability based upon such failure," and (2) "where a 
party waives a condition, the contract may be enforced despite 
the failure of such condition." Golfland Brief at p. 35. 
Both of these arguments are flawed. Golfland complains that 
it did not have its fair day in court on these two arguments. 
The reality is that Golfland has had two fair hearings on its 
claim that the Liquidator was responsible for the failed sale, a 
four day evidentiary hearing before the Bankruptcy Court and oral 
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argument based upon documentary evidence before the Third 
District Court. In rendering its decision, the Third District 
Court correctly applied collateral estoppel principles by finding 
that the contingencies to the sale were not met and the sale 
terms were not the same, and ordering a new auction for the SAIC 
Barn. The Third District Court did not usurp the role of the 
jury as alleged by Golfland, but had before it all of the 
necessary evidence to make these findings and to apply collateral 
estoppel against Golfland. Furthermore, Golfland's argument that 
the Liquidator allegedly waived the contingencies to the sale 
ignores the Third District Court's approval role in the process 
of concluding any sale of the SAIC Barn. 
1. The Third District Court Correctly Applied 
Collateral Estoppel Against Golfland. 
The case of Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 
Inc.. 758 P.2d 451, 455 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 769 
P.2d 819 (Utah 1988), is remarkably similar to this case. In an 
earlier action, Trimble unsuccessfully sued the buyer in a real 
estate transaction for a real estate commission. Trimble lost, 
and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Trimble then sued 
the seller, Monte Vista, for his real estate commission. "Monte 
Vista moved for summary judgment on a number of grounds, 
including res judicata and collateral estoppel, and attached to 
its supporting memorandum a copy of the Utah Supreme Court 
opinion affirming the judgment in the prior trial. Id. at 452. 
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Trimble attempted to controvert the Utah Supreme Court opinion by 
"a single paragraph disputing, in conclusory terms, Monte Vista's 
argument that the question of whether any commission was owed to 
Trimble had been litigated in the first action and decided 
adversely to Trimble." Id. "Additional memoranda were submitted 
and the motion orally argued, but Trimble offered no other 
information relative to the res judicata issue." Id. at 453. 
The trial court in the second action ruled against Trimble, and 
"relied, as had the parties, exclusively on the Supreme Court's 
reported decision in the earlier case." Id. 
On appeal, Trimble argued that the trial court improperly 
determined that collateral estoppel applied by relying solely 
upon the Utah Supreme Court opinion. This Court first reviewed 
the four elements of the test to determine whether collateral 
estoppel applies, namely: 
1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication 
identical with the one presented in the action in 
question? 
2) Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication? 
4) Was the issue in the first case competently, fully, 
and fairly litigated? 
Id. at 454, citing. Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 
(Utah 1978). This Court found that all four elements for 
applying collateral estoppel had been met. 
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Trimble claimed that the trial court was required to take 
judicial notice of the entire trial court record and determine 
for itself if it was consistent with the Utah Supreme Court 
opinion. This Court rejected Trimble's argument, concluding that 
Trimble acquiesced in the trial court's ruling based only on the 
published opinion: 
As we see it, once Monte Vista submitted to the 
district court a copy of the Supreme Court opinion, 
which on its face showed that the key issue had been 
litigated and decided, the burden shifted to Trimble, 
if it believed more than the opinion was needed to make 
a fully informed decision, to produce the record of the 
prior proceeding, urge the court to take judicial 
notice of it, or otherwise show that the opinion should 
not be taken at face value. Instead, Trimble limited 
its resistance to arguing how the Supreme Court opinion 
should actually be construed and to the doctrinal 
requirements of collateral estoppel. . . . The trial 
court in this case was likewise led to believe that the 
opinion was all that it needed to decide the collateral 
estoppel aspect of the motion for summary judgment. 
Id. at 455. 
The four elements for the application of collateral estoppel 
likewise were satisfied before the Third District Court.6 First, 
the two issues before the Bankruptcy Court (i.e., whether or not 
the Bankruptcy Court would approve the sale of the Water Park to 
6
 Under the Mel Trimble analysis, the Third District Court 
was not required to take judicial notice of the entire Bankruptcy 
Court record in order to rule on collateral estoppel grounds. 
Id. at 455-456. The Third District Court ruled on the basis of 
those portions of the Bankruptcy Court record and other 
documentary evidence submitted to it by the parties. However, 
the Mel Trimble case makes its clear that the Third District 
Court's judicial notice of the 1994 Bankruptcy Order by itself 
would be a sufficient basis to uphold the 1995 Order. 
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Golfland, and whether or not there a binding agreement on the 
terms of the sale of the combined properties that would give 
Golfland a vested right to the properties) were also at issue 
before the Third District Court. Second, it is beyond dispute 
that the Bankruptcy Court's decision, as affirmed by the Federal 
District Court and the Tenth Circuit, is a final decision on the 
merits. Third, Golfland was a party to both actions. Fourth, 
the issue was competently, fully and fairly litigated7 in a four 
day evidentiary hearing before the Bankruptcy Court in which 
Golfland fully participated. 
Golfland will undoubtedly argue, as it has argued before in 
its federal court appeals, that collateral estoppel does not 
apply because Golfland and the sellers of the combined properties 
were allegedly not adversaries at the Bankruptcy Court hearing. 
However, that argument does not make any sense with respect to 
the undisputed fact that Bankruptcy Court approval of the sale of 
the Water Park to Golfland was withdrawn. That argument, if 
7
 Golfland will undoubtedly argue, as it repeatedly did in 
its federal appeals, that it was "ambushed" before the Bankruptcy 
Court and was therefore prejudiced and did not get a fair 
hearing. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument. "[T]here was 
no lack of vigorous action by Golfland in building the record to 
uphold the first sale to Golfland. Nor has Golfland suggested or 
shown that BCD somehow obstructed or prevented it from developing 
any aspect of the record that would have a material impact on 
this appeal. Considering the lack of such a showing, and the 
extensive record [from the four day evidentiary hearing] — much 
of which consisted of Mr. Shields' [Golfland's attorney] 
questioning — we are at a loss to understand how Golfland has 
been prejudiced." In re BCD Corp., supra, 119 F.3d at 858-59. 
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applicable, could apply only to the Bankruptcy Court's finding 
that there was no enforceable contract. 
The Utah courts do not adhere to the requirement of strict 
"adverseness" to apply collateral estoppel. Indeed, this Court 
in the Mel Trimble case stated that collateral estoppel, or issue 
preclusion, could be applied "even if only 'the party against 
whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a 
party to the prior adjudication.,M Id. at 453, quoting. Copper 
State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno. 735 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). Accord, Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 278 (8th Cir. 
1979) (requirement of strict "adversity" to apply collateral 
estoppel relaxed; "[i]f a stranger to the prior litigation may 
invoke estoppel as a defense, then a fortiori a co-party in the 
prior action ought to be able to preclude a former co-party from 
relitigating issues finally adjudicated in the prior lawsuit"). 
Even if adversary status is required, the Tenth Circuit 
has recognized that even co-parties who technically are on the 
same side of a controversy on the pleadings, but who are in fact 
adversarial to each other as to an issue, can be bound by the 
adjudication of that issue in the prior controversy: 
But the formal arrangement of the parties on the 
record is not important, and if coparties on the record 
were in fact adversaries as to an issue, and such issue 
was in fact litigated and they had full opportunity to 
contest it with each other, either upon the pleadings 
between themselves and the plaintiff or upon cross-
pleadings between themselves, they are concluded by the 
adjudication of such issue in a subseguent controversy 
between each other. 
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Ohio Casualty Ins, Co, v. Gordon. 95 F.2d 605, 609 (10th Cir. 
1938) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
Comment (a) to Section 38 of the Restatement Second of 
Judgments provides further support for why parties who are 
technically not adversaries under the pleadings can still be 
bound by collateral estoppel: 
[P]arties aligned on the same side in the pleadings may 
be drawn into controversy between themselves on an 
issue that is at the same time material to their rights 
or obligations regarding their common adversary and to 
rights and obligations subsisting between them. Thus, 
defendants sued by a plaintiff who has stated a claim 
against them in the alternative may defend not only by 
disputing the plaintiff's case but by adducing proof 
and argument against each other. . . . In such 
circumstances, the co-parties may have an opportunity 
and incentive to litigate the issues arising between 
them that is equivalent to that between parties whose 
opposition is defined through pleadings. . . . Where 
those criteria are satisfied, the determination of the 
issues has equivalent effect as if they were pleaded. 
Restatement Second of Judgments, Section 38, Comment (a) (1982). 
In this case, SAIC and Golfland were "drawn into controversy 
between themselves" during the 1994 hearing before the Bankruptcy 
Court because of the differing proof supplied by witnesses for 
SAIC and Golfland as to whether or not there had been agreement 
on the original terms for the sale of the combined properties. 
The attorney for the Liquidator testified that there was 
confusion about the sale terms. In re BCD Corp., supra, 119 F.3d 
at 861-62. "[T]he bankruptcy court could not enforce the 
original terms of the sale because there had been no agreement as 
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to the original terms, as demonstrated by the testimony of Mr. 
Monson." Id. at 862. 
Golfland's attorney called various witnesses in an attempt 
to show that Golfland had not altered the sale terms, id. at 859 
n.6, but even Golfland's main witness, Mr. Kenney, was forced to 
concede that there was confusion as to the sale terms. Id. at 
861. SAIC and Golfland had the opportunity and the incentive to 
litigate whether the parties had agreed upon sale terms for the 
combined properties, and the Bankruptcy Court's finding that "the 
parties could not agree on the terms of the sale," id. at 861 
n.7r was essential to "the bankruptcy court's decision to set 
aside the confirmed sale on the ground that it had been entered 
under a mistake as to the terms of the agreement [which the Tenth 
Circuit ruled] was not an abuse of discretion." Id. at 861-62. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that SAIC and Golfland 
were not adverse to each other in presenting proof to the 
Bankruptcy Court on whether there was a meeting of the minds on 
the sale terms for the combined properties, formal "adversity" is 
not required if the finding made in the first suit is an 
essential element in the subsequent action: 
Co-parties who are not adversaries, may be bound by a 
judgment in a subsequent controversy between each other 
where they, in fact, occupied, in the prior trial, the 
attitude of adversaries, or where some finding of fact 
is made in the first suit which is an essential element 
in the subsequent claim or action. On the questions 
whether parties are bound by a judgment, the formal 
arrangement of parties on the record is unimportant, so 
that if co-parties on the record were, in fact, 
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adversaries on an issue, and the issue was actually 
litigated, and they had full opportunity to contest it 
with each other, either on pleadings between themselves 
and the plaintiff, or on cross-pleadings between 
themselves, co-parties are concluded by adjudication of 
that issue in a subsequent controversy between each 
other. 
Fidelity & Casualty Co, of New York v. Federal Express, 136 F.2d 
35, 38-39 (6th Cir. 1943). 
In this instance, the Bankruptcy Court's finding "that there 
had not been an agreement as to the terms of the sale" of the 
water park, In re BCD Corporation, supra, 119 F.3d at 862, was an 
essential element in the Third District Court's ruling that the 
terms of the 1994 order were different than the terms that 
Golfland was trying to enforce. Golfland is barred by collateral 
estoppel from relitigating that issue. 
2. The Third District Court Was Fully Entitled to 
Decide the Issues Before It and Did Not Usurp the 
Role of the Jury. 
Golfland argues that the Third District Court usurped 
the role of the jury as the fact-finder and committed procedural 
error because it failed to give Golfland the benefit of a jury 
trial. Golfland Brief at pp. 22-23. Golfland's argument lacks 
credence, however, because no complaint was on file and no jury 
was in place. The Liquidator's Motion sought the "permission of 
the court" to sell the SAIC Barn. The Third District Court had 
full authority to rule on the Liquidator's Motion. No jury trial 
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is available to an objecting party under the Utah Insurance 
Code.8 
Despite the fact that the Golfland Motion was on file, the 
Third District Court was not required to defer its decision on 
whether the SAIC Barn could be sold until a complaint was filed 
by Golfland and that Golfland's lawsuit fully resolved. The 
Liquidator clearly has the power under the Utah Insurance Code to 
sell SAICs property, including the SAIC Barn, free and clear of 
all liens, interests and encumbrances and to request, by motion, 
approval from the Third District Court for any proposed sale.9 
By seeking leave to sue the Liquidator, Golfland did not 
automatically obtain a stay of all further proceedings in the 
Third District Court regarding the SAIC Barn. 
D. The Third District Court Correctly Ruled That the 1994 
Order Was No Longer Effective And That the SAIC Barn 
Should Be Reauctioned. 
8If a jury trial had to be held each time the Liquidator 
sought to sell an asset, the liquidation of an insurance company 
would required years of litigation, and virtually all of the 
assets of the insurance company would be expended in litigation 
costs, leaving nothing for policyholders and creditors. The Utah 
Insurance Code properly requires only that the Liquidator obtain 
the "permission of the court" and.not that jury trials be 
conducted every time the Liquidator seeks Third District Court 
approval to sell an asset. 
9The powers of the Liquidator outlined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-27-314 include the following power: "He may exercise all 
the powers conferred upon receivers by the laws of this state 
which are not inconsistent with this chapter." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-27-314 (23) . Utah law has long provided that receivers are 
entitled to sell receivership property free and clear of liens in 
order to facilitate the sale of the receivership property. 
Chapman v. Schiller. 95 Utah 514, 83 P.2d 249, 252 (Utah 1938). 
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1. The Third District Court Correctly Found That The 
Conditions Precedent To Closing The Sale of the 
SAIC Barn to Golfland Had Failed, 
The Third District Court correctly applied the collateral 
estoppel principles outlined above and found, based upon the 
Bankruptcy Court's ruling, that at least three conditions 
precedent to the sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland as approved by 
Judge Stirba in the 1994 Order were not met. The Third District 
Court's legal conclusion that the Liquidator was no longer 
obligated to sell the SAIC Barn to Golfland naturally flowed from 
those findings. 
It is well settled that if a condition precedent does not 
occur according to the express or implied terms of a contract, 
and the condition precedent is not excused, the conditional duty 
to close is discharged. See Restatement, Contracts (2d) § 251 
(1). For instance, in Welch Transfer and Storage, Inc. v. 
Oldham. 663 P.2d 73 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
"[w]here fulfillment of a contract is made to depend upon the act 
or consent of a third person over whom neither party has any 
control, the contract cannot be enforced unless the act is 
performed or the consent given." Id. at 76. 
2. The Third District Court Correctly Found That the 
Terms of the Original Barn Sale Order Were Not the 
Terms Golfland Was Seeking to Enforce. 
The Third District Court also found in the 1995 Order that: 
Judge Stirba's February 24, 1994 Order authorizing the 
sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland is ineffective 
because the terms of the sale that Judge Stirba 
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approved in her Order were not the terms of the sale 
that was frustrated by the Bankruptcy Court Order• 
R. 3133. This finding mirrors the finding of the Bankruptcy 
Court that "[t]he terms that the parties thought they were 
bargaining and bidding on turn out not to be the terms of the 
sale which is ultimately proposed to the court.1' R. at 2606. 
See also. In re BCD Corp., supra, 119 F.3d at 861. The 
Bankruptcy Court found that the parties did not agree on the 
terms of the sale, and there was no meeting of the minds for an 
enforceable contract.10 
Golfland is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
from relitigating these findings of the Bankruptcy Court, which 
the Third District Court relied upon to conclude that the sale 
terms which Golfland was attempting to enforce were not the sale 
terms which Judge Stirba had approved. Moreover, Golfland is 
precluded on two grounds from arguing that Judge Henriod should 
have enforced the original terms approved by Judge Stirba. 
First, the original sale terms approved by Judge Stirba required 
a simultaneous sale of all three combined properties by a certain 
10
 The Tenth Circuit reconciled an apparent inconsistency in 
the Bankruptcy Court's findings as follows: "We recognize an 
apparent inconsistency in the bankruptcy court's oral findings 
regarding whether all of the bidders understood that the 
environmental warranties had been waived or whether the parties 
could not agree on the terms of the sale. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that, to reach its stated holding of vacating the confirmed 
sale, the bankruptcy court must have relied on the finding that 
the parties could not agree on the terms of the sale." In re BCD 
Corp., supra, 119 F.3d at 861 n.7. 
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deadline. A simultaneous sale could not longer be accomplished 
once the Bankruptcy Court withdrew approval of the sale of the 
Water Park to Golfland and eventually approved its sale to a 
third party. Second, Golfland also advanced the same argument to 
the Tenth Circuit, who rejected it on the basis that "the 
bankruptcy court could not enforce the original terms of the sale 
because there had been no agreement as to the original terms . . 
. ." In re BCD Corp., supra, 119 F.3d at 862. 
3. Golfland is Precluded From Arguing That the 
Failure of the Conditions Precedent Was Caused Bv 
the Liguidator. 
Golfland insists that the Liquidator allegedly caused the 
conditions precedent to fail. However, if anything, the evidence 
before the Third District Court demonstrated that the conditions 
precedent were not met because of Golfland's actions, not those 
of the Liquidator. R. 2062-2064, 2640. Golfland claims that the 
Liquidator should have sought additional approval from the 
Bankruptcy Court because, according to Golfland, the parties 
entered into a new agreement to supplement the provisions of the 
previous contract for the sale of the Water Park. Golfland Brief 
at pp. 7-8, f 12. 
It is inconsistent for Golfland to assert that the 
Liquidator should have obtained approval for a "new" agreement 
when Golfland repeatedly (but unsuccessfully) argued to the 
Bankruptcy Court, to the Federal District Court, and to the Tenth 
Circuit that there was no change in the terms of the sale. See, 
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In re BCD Corp., supra, 119 F.3d at 862. Furthermore, Golfland's 
argument assumes that the Bankruptcy Court would have approved 
the alleged "new" terms for the sale. However, the Bankruptcy 
Court found that there was never any agreement on the material 
sale terms to create an enforceable contract for the Bankruptcy 
Court to enforce or approve.11 
4. The Third District Court Did Not Approve Any 
Alleged Waiver of the Conditions Precedent 
Mandated by Judge Stirba's Original Barn Sale 
Order. 
Golfland insists that the Liquidator "waived" the conditions 
precedent to the sale of the SAIC Barn, and complains that the 
Third District Court did not enforce the alleged "waiver."12 
11
 Golfland also complains that the Liquidator engaged in 
"secret negotiations" and "double-dealing" with Peak, the back-up 
bidder for the Water Park. Golfland Brief at p. 8. Golfland 
evidently believes that the approved back-up bidder for the Water 
Park should have been kept in the dark about the dispute between 
Golfland and the sellers of the combined properties over the 
terms of the sale. Golfland undoubtedly concludes that if Peak 
had been kept in the dark, the sale to Golfland would never have 
been upset. Golfland's obsession with secrecy highlights 
Golfland's sole responsibility for causing the sale of the Water 
Park and the simultaneous sale of the SAIC Barn to unravel. 
12
 The Liquidator previously acknowledged in the first appeal 
to this Court that on April 8, 1994, the Liquidator offered to 
proceed with the sale of the SAIC Barn separately on that date. 
(Had such an offer been accepted by Golfland, immediate approval 
for such an offer from the Third District Court would have been 
mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-314 (9)). However, Golfland 
refused the Liquidator's offer, choosing instead to "wait and 
see" how the Bankruptcy Court ruled. The Liquidator's offer to 
close solely on the SAIC Barn expired the same day it was made, 
April 9, 1994, which was the deadline for the simultaneous sale 
of the combined properties. Obviously Golfland is not attempting 
retroactively to enforce this offer, which Golfland never 
(continued...) 
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However, this argument ignores the fact that no evidence of any 
enforceable waiver was presented by Golfland to the Third 
District Court,13 and also ignores the well-settled principle 
that it is not the Liquidator, but the Third District Court which 
must approve the terms of sale of property under the court's 
receivership supervision, including any waiver of court-approved 
conditions. 
When the Third District Court entered the 1994 Order and 
when it ordered that the SAIC Barn be reauctioned in the 1995 
Order, it was functioning as a supervising receivership court. 
See, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-314 (17) (Liquidator has all powers 
conferred upon receivers by Utah state law) and Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-27-314 (9) ("no transaction involving [SAIC] property with a 
market value exceeding $25,000 may be concluded without the 
express permission of the [Third District] court.") 
A receivership is an equitable matter and is 
entirely within the control of the court. . . . The 
possession by the court of the res in a receivership 
proceeding gives the court the power to determine all 
questions concerning the ownership and disposition of 
the property. The receiver is an officer and arm of 
the court and acts under the direction and supervision 
of the court. As such, he has only very limited powers 
and should apply to the court for advice and 
directions. 
12(. . .continued) 
accepted, but rather is alleging a different "open-ended" waiver 
allegedly made after this date. 
13While Golfland cites to memoranda in its Brief, these 
citations are almost exclusively to legal argument and not to any 
documents or other evidence before the Third District Court. 
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Interlake Co, v. Von Hake. 697 P.2d 238, 239-40 (Utah 1985). 
In Chapman v. Schiller. 95 Utah 514, 83 P.2d 249, 251 (Utah 
1938), the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
A receiver's sale is said to be a judicial sale as 
contradistinguished from a sheriff's sale on execution 
or foreclosure. And such judicial sales, unless 
defined or regulated by statute, rest upon and are 
governed bv the order of the court decreeing the sale. 
In a judicial sale the court makes its own law of the 
sale, subject only to the use of the sound discretion 
in the exercise of the power. 
(Emphasis added and citation omitted). 
It is beyond dispute that the Third District Court had the 
power and exercised that power to approve the conditions to the 
sale of the SAIC Barn presented to it initially by the 
Liquidator. Those conditions were "set in stone" in the 1994 
Order, and could not be altered without court approval. 
When it became clear to the Third District Court that the 
original conditions for the sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland had 
not been met, the Third District Court as the supervising 
receivership court established new conditions for the sale (a new 
auction), thereby modifying its original "law of the sale." The 
Third District Court's discretion in dealing with property in its 
control of is not limited as Golfland contends. Furthermore, 
Golfland had no vested rights in the SAIC Barn when the 
conditions for the sale to Golfland failed. The Third District 
Court was not required to adhere to Golfland's demands for the 
property any more than the Third District Court was required to 
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honor the Liquidator's request for authorization to sell the SAIC 
Barn to Provo City. The Third District Court did not abuse its 
discretion when it ordered a new auction of the SAIC Barn, giving 
all interested parties, including Golfland and Provo City, the 
opportunity to participate. Likewise, the Liquidator acted 
appropriately by going to the Third District Court in his 
capacity as receiver and seeking the direction of the supervising 
receivership court on disposition of the SAIC Barn when the 
original sale to Golfland failed. 
Golfland's complaints suffer from the same defects 
identified by Judge Kimball in the third BCD appeal. See, 
Exhibit MB.M Golfland would like to have its original contract 
for the SAIC Barn enforced. Unfortunately for Golfland, the 
conditions precedent for the sale never materialized, and there 
was never any meeting of the minds to create an enforceable 
contract in any event. Golfland would also like to have its new 
"contract" for the SAIC Barn enforced, which Golfland claims was 
created when the Liquidator allegedly agreed to waive the 
conditions precedent. 
Golfland's standing to seek enforcement of any "new 
contract" for the sale for the SAIC Barn is also seriously in 
question. When the 1994 Order became ineffective after the 
conditions to the sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland were not met, 
Golfland was relegated to the status of a mere disappointed 
bidder for the SAIC Barn, with no recognizable claim to enforce. 
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In In re Broadmoor Place Investments, L.P. (G-K Development 
Company. Inc. v. Broadmoor Place Investments, L.P.), 994 F.2d 744 
(10th Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994), an 
unsuccessful bidder for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy debtor's property 
which was sold to another bidder with the bankruptcy court's 
approval argued that it was the rightful purchaser of the 
property. G-K, the unsuccessful bidder, argued on appeal that it 
had a contract with the debtor for the purchase of the property. 
The Tenth Circuit rejected this assertion. 
While G-K calls its collective signed instruments 
here a "contract", this is a misnomer since there can 
be no contract in this situation without Bankruptcy 
Court approval, In re Landscape Properties, Inc., 100 
B.R. 445, 447 (Bankr.E.D.Ark. 1988). Accordingly, 
these instruments are but binding bids, and we so refer 
to them hereafter. 
Id. at 745 n.l. The Tenth Circuit determined that G-K as an 
unsuccessful bidder was not an "aggrieved person" with standing 
to appeal the bankruptcy court's approval of the sale to another 
party. Absent court approval, a mere bidder for receivership 
property has no recognizable interest in the disposition of the 
receivership property. 
5. The Third District Court Properly Found That 
Golfland's Tender Was Insufficient As a Matter of 
Law. 
Golfland argues that the Third District Court erred in 
ruling that Golfland failed to make a proper tender of the 
purchase funds for the SAIC Barn. Golfland Brief at p. 46. "To 
obtain a decree of specific performance . . ., the aggrieved 
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party must make an unconditional tender of the performance 
required by the agreement." Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 
846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992). To make an unconditional 
tender, the party tendering must tender exactly what it agreed to 
perform when the contract was made, and may not impose new 
conditions. "A tender that contains an improper condition or 
requirement disqualifies a party from obtaining a decree of 
specific performance." Id. 
Under the terms of the Golfland Offer for the SAIC Barn, 
Golfland was to "deposit with the Title Company the entire 
balance of the Purchase Price in cash or other immediately 
available funds." R. 1250. Golfland deposited the funds with 
the Title Company, but with the express instruction that the 
funds on deposit were there at the sole discretion of Golfland. 
R. 1934. Because the Golfland deposit was conditional, the Third 
District Court was fully justified in finding that Golfland 
failed to make an unconditional tender of the purchase price and 
thus lost its right to seek specific performance, even assuming 
that a contract for the sale of the SAIC Barn was formed. 
II. THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY PROCEDURAL 
ERRORS BY ORDERING A REAUCTION OF THE SAIC BARN. 
Golfland contends in Point II of its Brief that the Third 
District Court committed "glaring" procedural errors and that as 
a result of those errors, Golfland has been deprived of its 
constitutional right to due process and to a jury. Golfland 
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Brief at pp. 22-26. Golfland's due process argument ignores the 
collateral estoppel effects of the four day evidentiary hearing 
before the Bankruptcy Court. The issues before the Third 
District Court were fully and fairly litigated, with both SAIC 
and Golfland presenting documentary evidence, lengthy memoranda, 
and oral arguments. Moreover, none of the purported procedural 
errors were ever raised by Golfland before the Third District 
Court, and therefore Golfland cannot now raise them for the first 
time on appeal. 
A. The Third District Court Did Not Err in Finding That 
Evidence Was Submitted With the Pleadings. 
Golfland argues that no evidence was submitted to the Third 
District Court. Golfland Brief at p. 24. This is incorrect. 
Both SAIC and Golfland submitted substantial documentary evidence 
with their pleadings (See R. 1835-1862; 1922-1956; 2055-2075; 
2600-2644) in accordance with Rule 4-501(1)(a) & (b) of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration. Those sections set forth the 
"procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda and documents 
with the court." They provide in relevant part as follows: 
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, 
except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied 
by a memorandum of points and authorities appropriate 
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to 
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other 
documents relied upon in support of the motion. . . . 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The 
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties 
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation. 
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(Emphasis added). 
The Liquidator and Golfland utilized the foregoing procedure 
to present to the Third District Court lengthy memoranda and 
supporting documentation and deposition excerpts which both the 
Liquidator and Golfland contended supported their respective 
positions. Golfland did not object, nor did Golfland claim that 
any of the documents attached to the Liquidator's memoranda were 
not relevant or admissible or that they lacked foundation. 
Golfland itself used this procedure for bringing before the Third 
District Court the evidence and documents that it asserted were 
relevant to its position. It is ironic that Golfland is now 
arguing that the documents and other evidence submitted to the 
Third District Court should not be considered when Golfland 
itself followed this procedure in support of its position.14 
1. Golfland Waived By Acquiescence Any Objection to 
the Submission of the Documentary Evidence. 
Golfland waived by acquiescence any objection to the 
submission of evidence in the form of documents attached to the 
parties' memoranda. Golfland could have objected to the 
evidence, moved to strike, submitted affidavits of its own, or 
requested an evidentiary hearing. Compare, Mel Trimble Real 
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., supra, 758 P.2d at 455. 
Golfland did none of these things. Instead, Golfland limited its 
14
 It is also ironic that Golfland cites to the allegedly 
"inadmissible" or "incompetent" documentary evidence in its 
appeal brief. See, Golfland Brief at pp. 5-10. 
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response to arguing the meaning of the facts in the Liquidator's 
documents and to legal arguments, and then Golfland attached its 
own documents to its memoranda and argued the meaning of the 
facts in those documents. Golfland cannot complain about this 
procedure for the first time on appeal when it acquiesced in this 
process before the Third District Court and even submitted its 
own evidence in this form. As this Court stated in the Mel 
Trimble case under similar circumstances, •• [s]ince the parties 
all but conceded that the opinion alone would permit the district 
court to make an informed decision on the applicability of 
collateral estoppel, the trial court did not err in failing to 
review the record of the prior proceeding on its own motion." 
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc.. supra. 758 
P.2d at 456. 
As in Mel Trimble, the Liquidator raised collateral estoppel 
agreements. Also, as in Mel Trimble, Golfland limited its 
response to arguing what the documents meant and to legal 
arguments. Thus, evidentiary objections were waived, and 
Golfland may not now argue that the Third District Court erred in 
finding that evidence was submitted with the pleadings. 
Golfland also argues that even though documents and 
deposition excerpts were submitted to the Third District Court, 
they were not admissible. However, under Rule 103 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, Golfland was obligated to raise any objections 
that it may have had to the admissibility of the documents that 
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were submitted to the Third District Court by the Liquidator.15 
Golfland never argued that the documents submitted to the Third 
District Court by the Liquidator were inadmissible because they 
contained hearsay, were not authenticated, lacked foundation, or 
had some other defect. Having failed to raise those issues prior 
to the hearing, Golfland waived any objections it may have had to 
the evidence submitted to the Third District Court by the 
Liquidator.16 D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 
1989) (party's failure to object to evidentiary problems or 
errors waives the objection). 
Golfland maintains that it objected to the portion of the 
Proposed Order that stated that evidence was submitted with the 
pleadings. Golfland Brief at p. 23, n.20. However, this 
objection went only to the form of the Third District Court's 
order. This was after the hearing had already been conducted and 
the Third District Court had already ruled. This was too late to 
raise evidentiary objections. "Error may not be predicated upon 
a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial 
15Obviously, Golfland is estopped from objecting to the 
admissibility of the documents which Golfland itself submitted to 
the Third District Court. 
16Even on appeal, Golfland does not challenge the accuracy or 
the evidentiary value of any of the documents submitted to the 
Liquidation Court by the Liquidator. Golfland merely argues that 
the documents were not "supported by any affidavit or otherwise 
submitted in admissible form." Golfland Brief at p. 25. Thus, 
Golfland has failed to show that a "substantial right" was 
affected, as required by Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a). 
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right of a party is affected, and . . . a timely objection or 
motion to strike appears of record." Utah R. Evid. 103(a) 
(emphasis added). By the time the Proposed Order was submitted, 
the hearing was over. The Third District Court could not rule on 
evidentiary objections nor could the Liquidator take steps to 
overcome any objection. For example, if Golfland had concerns 
about lack of foundation for a document, the Liquidator could 
have offered affidavits or other testimony. It is now too late 
to do so and it is also too late for Golfland to object. Its 
objections, if any, are not "timely" under Rule 103(a). 
B. The Third District Court Did Not Err By Not Holding An 
Evidentiary Hearing. 
The Liquidator and Golfland had the opportunity to explain 
their respective positions at the Third District Court hearing. 
During the hearing, the Third District Court also considered the 
arguments of counsel relating to the Bankruptcy Court's four day 
evidentiary hearing, where Golfland had the benefit of an 
exhaustive consideration of all aspects of the failed sale of the 
combined properties. The Third District Court chose to rule 
based upon the evidence presented to it (on judicial notice and 
collateral estoppel grounds) rather than ordering an evidentiary 
hearing. That decision by the Third District Court was not in 
error. 
Golfland had full notice of the issues being raised. The 
matters before the Third District Court were fully and 
44 
extensively briefed by both the Liquidator and Golfland with 
supporting documentation and deposition excerpts. Golfland was 
given every opportunity to address the Liquidator's position, to 
object to the evidence submitted by the Liquidator, and to 
convince the Third District Court of Golfland's position at the 
hearing. This amounts to full and fair litigation. 
1. Golfland Waived Its Right to An Evidentiary 
Hearing. 
Moreover, Golfland also waived the right to an evidentiary 
hearing. None of Golfland's memoranda requested an evidentiary 
hearing on the Liquidator's Motion for Supplemental Order, or 
even suggested that an evidentiary hearing would be appropriate 
or necessary for the District Court to rule on the Liquidator's 
motion. In the case of Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, v. 
Baglev & Co., 863 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other 
grounds, 901 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals 
held the following: fl[T]he fact that none of the parties 
requested an evidentiary hearing prior to October 25, 1988, the 
date of oral argument, suggests that, as of that date, they saw 
no need for such a hearing and thus waived it." Id. at 7. See 
also Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) ("Issues not raised in the trial court in timely 
fashion are deemed waived, precluding this court from considering 
their merits on appeal.") 
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Golfland never suggested that the rules governing summary 
judgment motions should apply to the Liquidator's Motion. 
Golfland only requested oral argument on the Liquidator's Motion, 
which the Third District Court granted. By failing to request an 
evidentiary hearing prior to oral argument, Golfland waived any 
right to an evidentiary hearing on the Liquidator's Motion, and 
may not belatedly raise that issue for the first time on appeal. 
III. THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER IS NOT INTERNALLY 
INCONSISTENT OR OTHERWISE FATALLY FLAWED. 
Notwithstanding Golfland's complaints, the Barn Order is not 
internally inconsistent or otherwise fatally flawed. The Barn 
Order does not deprive Golfland of any rights because it orders 
the Liquidator to sell the SAIC Barn at a new auction to the 
party making the highest and best offer, thereby providing 
Golfland an opportunity to participate. 
The fact that the Third District Court granted the Golfland 
Motion at the same time it granted the Liquidator's Motion does 
not render the 1995 Order internally inconsistent. The Golfland 
Motion was a procedural motion. Under the Utah Insurance Code 
all actions against SAIC and the Liquidator are stayed. Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-27-317 (1). In granting the Golfland Motion, the 
Third District Court merely lifted the stay and gave Golfland the 
opportunity to file a complaint setting forth whatever causes of 
action it deemed appropriate against SAIC. The fact that the 
Third District Court granted the Golfland Motion did not 
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constitute a ruling on the sufficiency of the Golfland Complaint, 
nor the claims set forth therein. Nor does it preclude the 
Liquidator from arguing that Golfland's claims are barred by 
collateral estoppel.17 
A. The District Court's Finding That the SAIC Barn Was Not 
Unique Was Not Central to the Finding That the 
Conditions Precedent to Sale the SAIC Barn to Golfland 
Were Not Met. 
After ruling that the Liquidator had no contractual duty to 
sell the SAIC Barn to Golfland, the Third District Court went on 
to find that the SAIC Barn was not so unique that specific 
performance would be warranted. Golfland complains that the 
record does not support this finding and that the Third District 
Court therefore erred. Golfland Brief at pp. 27-28. However, 
the finding of uniqueness was not central to the Third District 
Court's finding that the conditions precedent for a sale of the 
SAIC Barn to Golfland had not been satisfied. This Court can 
still affirm the 1995 order without relying upon this finding. 
Whether or not the SAIC Barn is unique, the Liquidator had no 
obligation to sell it to Golfland. 
B. Golfland's "Shocks The Conscience" Standard is Not 
Applicable in This Case. 
17
 Neither party appealed the Third District Court's order 
granting the Golfland Motion. The validity of the Golfland 
Complaint is not before this Court but remains before the Third 
District Court. 
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Golfland has devoted much time and energy to decisions from 
various federal courts regarding the finality of judicially-
approved sales, while virtually ignoring the Tenth Circuit's 
pronouncements on this issue in the companion Water Park case 
lost by Golfland, See, In re BCD Corporation, supra, 119 F.3d at 
859-860. Golfland asserts that the Third District Court 
exhibited a "complete misunderstanding" of the legal standard 
governing judicial sales. Golfland Brief at p. 30. 
The cases cited by Golfland are not relevant. The Third 
District Court did not set aside the 1994 Order, which merely 
authorized (but did not order) the Liquidator to sell the SAIC 
Barn to Golfland if all of the conditions outlined in the 
approval documents submitted to the Third District Court were 
met. Those conditions were not met, and the anticipated sale 
failed. Once the sale failed, the 1994 Order became 
"ineffective" as found by Judge Henriod; not because the 1994 
Order was "set aside," but because the conditions for the 1994 
Order to take effect were never met. 
Even if the Third District Court is deemed to have vacated a 
judicial sale of the SAIC Barn, the standard adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court is "that a court of equity may overturn a judicial 
sale for good and sufficient cause." Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 2d 
52, 337 P.2d 429, 430 (1959). 
The policy of the courts is to uphold judicial 
sales except when they are manifestly unfair. . . . 
This is because courts hope that such a policy will 
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encourage bidding at judicial sales and because it 
appears to be a waste of time to require a new sale 
where little evidence is presented to show that the bid 
price at the new sale will be any different from the 
bid at the old. 
Id. at 431 (citations omitted). Such good and sufficient cause 
was clearly established by the evidence presented to the Third 
District Court, and it would be manifestly unfair to mandate that 
the SAIC Barn be sold to Golfland when the carefully negotiated 
conditions precedent to the sale approved by the Third District 
Court were never met. The Barn Order is neither internally 
inconsistent, nor erroneous in any other way. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding Golfland's arguments that it has been 
deprived of due process, ordering the Third District Court to 
conduct a meaningless additional evidentiary hearing on 
Golfland's meritless claims would be an enormous waste of 
judicial resources. Notwithstanding three federal appeals, 
Golfland has been unsuccessful in reversing the Bankruptcy 
Court's withdrawal of approval of the sale of the Water Park to 
Golfland, which "frustrated" the sale of the SAIC Barn to 
Golfland as found by the Third District Court. The Third 
District Court acted properly and within its powers as the 
supervising receivership court in ordering a new auction of the 
SAIC Barn. The Liquidator respectfully requests that the Sale 
Order be affirmed. 
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This case is an appeal from the bankruptcy court's order 
setting aside its approval of a sale of property to appellant 
Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. and accepting a new bid from 
appellee Peak Investment, Inc. on the same property. The court has 
considered the arguments presented by all parties, and rules as 
follows: 
The court finds that the bankruptcy court's ruling that the 
sale should be set at-ide is not an abuse of discretion. The 
bankruptcy court founi that there was a mistake in the sale 
sufficient to justify setting aside the sale because "[©Jveryone at 
the auction believed that the risk of environmental problems on the 
property being purchassd was shifted to the buyer." This factual 
rinding is supported by sufficient evidence in the record, and the^ 
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court's finding that tiis misunderstanding is a mistake as tc a 
material term of the s ile appears correct. Such a mistake would 
indicate that the bidders did not have a fair opportunity to bid at 
the sale, and mistakes which affect the fairness of the bidding 
process are the type which would ordinarily be. seen as sufficient 
to justify setting asice a confirmed sale. See Mason v. AshharV. 
383 F.2d 547, 552 (10th Clr. 1967). 
In addition, the court finds that appellee Peak Investments, 
Inc. had sufficient interest as an approved backup bidder to give 
it standing to challenges the confirmation of the sale, and that the 
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to consider the objection, which 
was relevant to the «alf! of the property over which the bankruptcy 
court had jurisdiction due to the fact that the mistake in the 
bidding process affected the sale of all three properties, and not 
just the one property which was found to actually have environmen-
tal cleanup problems. 
For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the bankruptcy court 
is hereby AFFIWffiD. 
DATED this _*LZJf day of 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID SAM 
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 
2 
Unitad State* District court 
District of Utah A-1017 
September 20, 1995 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OFtffAir' ' 
CENTRAL DIVISION BY:_„ 
•E -erifttft 
IN RE BCD CORPORATION, 
Debtor, 
GOLFLAND ENTERTAINMENT 
CENTERS, INC., 
Appellant, 
v. 
BCD CORPORATION and SOUTHERN 
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Appellees. 
OPINION AND ORDER 
District Court No. 2:97 CV 953K 
RAY QUINNEY 
JUN 0 8 1998 
& NEBEKER 
This matter is before the court on an appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah, Central Division. This matter came on for oral argument on June 2,1998. 
The appellant was represented by Zachary T. Shields, Southern American Insurance Company 
was represented by Craig Carlile and Duane H. Gillman represented himself as the trustee. Oral 
argument was heard and the court took the matter under advisement. The court has carefully 
considered all briefs and other materials submitted by the parties. The court has further 
considered the law and facts relevant to this appeal. Now being fully advised, the court enters the 
following Opinion and Order. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This appeal arises out of three consolidated orders entered by the Bankruptcy Court for 
'/• 
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the District of Utah, Central Division. The first Order is dated October 2,1997 and is an Order 
Sustaining Trustee's Claims Objection and Disallowing the Proof of Claim filed by Golfland 
against the Debtor. The second Order is dated November 5,1997 and authorizes the Trustee's 
entry into settlement stipulation and mutual release of claims. This Order specifically gave court 
approval for the payment of estate funds to Southern American Insurance Company ("SAIC"). 
The final Order is also dated November 5,1997 and authorizes interim distribution to creditors. 
The appellant, Golfland, seeks reversal of these orders on the basis that actions of the Debtor in 
1994 resulted in damage to Golfland and Golfland should be given an opportunity to litigate the 
issues giving rise to these damages. 
In 1994 the Debtor, BCD, filed Bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. At the time of the filing, BCD attempted to sell its major asset, Seven Peaks Water Park in 
Provo, Utah. An auction was held and Golfland entered the highest bid of $2,200,000,00. BCD 
and Golfland entered into a contract for the sale and purchase of the water park at that price in 
February of 1994 (the "February Contract"). The terms of the February Contract were set forth in 
a written document, except as modified orally by the parties. The terms of the February Contract 
were presented to the Bankruptcy Court at a hearing on February 23,1994 and the Court 
approved the sale of the water park pursuant to the contract. At the time of the auction, a second 
company, Peak Investment, entered a backup bid for the water park for approximately 
$400,000.00 less than the bid of Golfland. 
After the approval of the February Contract some disputes arose between the Debtor and 
Golfland. After negotiations, a second contract was entered into between the parties in April of 
1994 (the "April Contract"). The parties did not seek, nor did they obtain, court approval of this 
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contract. On April 7,1994, Peak Investment filed a Motion with the Bankruptcy Court 
challenging the Court's approval of the February Contract. Both Golfland and the Debtor 
opposed Peak's Motion, however, the Bankruptcy Court granted the Motion vacating its 
approval of the February Contract. Although the Debtor opposed the Motion, once the 
Bankruptcy Court vacated the February Contract, the Debtor held a second auction for the water 
park in an attempt to make more money. The water park was sold to a third party for 
$3,600,000.00. 
Subsequent to the sale of the water park to a third party, Golfland appealed the 
Bankruptcy Court's Order vacating the February Contract. In September of 1995, Judge David 
Sam of the United States District Court for the District of Utah affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's 
Order. This decision was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in BCD Corporation v. Peak Investment, 
Inc., 119 F.3d 852 (1997). Golfland also filed a Proof of Claim in the Debtor's Bankruptcy Case 
which was objected to by the Trustee. A hearing was held on the matter and the Bankruptcy 
Court initially disallowed the Proof of Claim on the basis of collateral estoppel. Golfland filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration. The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on the Motion for 
Reconsideration and again disallowed the Proof of Claim, this time citing the Tenth Circuit 
opinion and the "law of the case" doctrine. Shortly thereafter the Bankruptcy Court entered the 
Stipulation Order and the Disbursement Order. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In the review of orders from the Bankruptcy Court, there are three standards of review 
that may be applied. First, where the Bankruptcy Court is the finder of fact, the court's factual 
determinations will not be set aside unless they are "clearly erroneous." See Bankruptcy Rule 
3 
8013 and Taylor v. I.R.S., 69 F.3d 411 (10th Cir. 1995). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous 
only if the court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. See In re 
Mama D'Angelo, Inc., 55 F.3d 552 (10th Cir. 1995). Secondly, a bankruptcy court's ruling 
involving findings of fact may be overturned if the findings are premised on improper legal 
standards or on proper legal standards improperly applied. In these instances, the review of this 
court shall be de novo. See In re Hedged-Investment Associates, Inc., 84 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 
1996). Lastly, this court will exercise de novo review over the Bankruptcy Court's conclusions of 
law. See Hall v. Vance, 887 F.2d 1041 (10th Cir. 1989). Further, mixed questions of law and fact 
which involve primarily a consideration of legal principles are reviewed de novo. See In re Ruti-
Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1988). Approvement of a compromise settlement and 
of interim distributions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Reiss v. Hagmann, 881 F.2d 
890, 891-92 (10th Cir. 1989) and In re Smith, 180 B.R. 648, 651 (D. Utah 1995). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Golfland's Proof of Claim consisted of seven causes of action. These included (1) breach 
of the February Contract, (2) breach of the April Contract, (3) breach of implied covenant of 
good faith, (4) negligence, (5) willful misconduct and bad faith, (6) remedies for detrimental 
reliance and (7) unjust enrichment. As stated above, the Bankruptcy Court disallowed the Proof 
of Claim on the basis that the Tenth Circuit had already decided that no contract existed and 
therefore Golfland did not have a cause of action. The Bankruptcy Court cited the "law of the 
case" doctrine in support of this ruling. In discussing the "law of the case" doctrine in Stifel, 
Nicolaus & Co. v. Woolsey & Co., 81 F.3d 1540,1543 (10th Cir. 1996), the Court stated that: 
The law of the case doctrine obligates every court to honor the 
4 
decisions of higher courts in the judicial hierarchy. "When a court 
decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern 
the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case." Thus, for 
example, a trial court may not reconsider a question decided by an 
appellate court. 
{citations omitted). Golfland argues on appeal that this was error for the reason that the Proof of 
Claim was not brought in the same case as was considered by the Tenth Circuit. 
In BCD Corporation v. Peak Investment, Inc., 119 F.3d 852 (1997) the Tenth Circuit held 
that it was not error or an abuse of discretion on the part of the Bankruptcy Court to set aside the 
sale of the water park to Golfland. The Tenth Circuit further held that there had not been an 
agreement as to the terms of the sale and "the bankruptcy court could not enforce the original 
terms of the sale because there had been no agreement as to the original terms " Id. at 862. 
In other words, the Tenth Circuit's ruling makes it clear that no contract existed between 
Golfland and BCD Corporation. Even though Golfland's Proof of Claim was not brought in the 
identical case that was appealed to the Tenth Circuit, it is clear to this court that all claims 
brought in the Proof of Claim are untenable based upon the umbrella of the Tenth Circuit's 
ruling and the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the final sale for $3,600,000.00 to a third party. 
All of Golfland's claims against BCD flow from the failure to perform under the February 
Contract. The Tenth Circuit has ruled that there was no meeting of the minds as to the February 
Contract and therefore no contract existed. If there was no contract, Golfland does not have a 
remedy at law. Although this may not be exactly the kind of case that the "law of the case" 
doctrine typically applies to, this court can not reverse the Tenth Circuit's ruling that there was 
no contract between the parties which is what would have to be done in order for the appellant to 
have a cause of action. 
5 
This court agrees with the appellees that when the February Contract was vacated, 
Golfland became nothing more than an unsuccessful and disappointed bidder. In In re 
Broadmoor, 994 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit held that an unsuccessful bidder 
does not have a breach of contract claim. In its ruling, the Bankruptcy Court stated that: 
This Court ruled that there was no contract and that was affirmed 
by the Tenth Circuit. I think the concept that is bothering Golfland 
is that there is not a remedy for every occurrence of damages. 
Before you can have damages you must have a cause of action. 
X 1 anscript of September 4, 1997 Hearing at p. 20. Golfland may very well have been damaged by 
the actions of the Debtor in this matter, however, it simply does not have a cause of action under 
the law. 
Lastly, Golfland argues that even if some of its allegations are barred by the Tenth Circuit 
ruling, not all of the allegations should be barred, specifically the claim for unjust enrichment. 
Golfland had the opportunity at two different hearings before the Bankruptcy Court to put forth 
evidence to support its claim that some of its causes of action encompassed different issues than 
the issue ruled upon by the Tenth Circuit. The fact that Golfland did not put on sufficient 
evidence when it had the chance does not mean that it should have another opportunity before the 
Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court heard the evidence and found that Golfland did not 
meet its burden of proof. This is a factual finding that will not be disturbed by this court. 
Therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the Judgment of the Bankruptcy Court is AFFIRMED. 
DATED this V ' d a v of June, 1998 
DALE A. KIMBALL 
United States District Judge 
6 
klh 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
June 5, 1998 
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MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577) 
RYAN E. TIBBITTS (A4423) 
KIM R. WILSON (A3512) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Peak Investments Ltd. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT-OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
In re: O R D E R 
BCD Corporation, Bankruptcy Number 92C-22663 
(Chapter 11) 
Debtor. 
Peak Investment, Inc.'s Amended Motion to Enforce Sale to 
Alternative Bidder and Motion for Stay, came before the Court for 
hearing on June 1, 2, 3, and 6, 1994. BCD Corporation 
("Debtor") was represented by William Thomas Thurman and Mona 
Lyman; Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. ("Golfland") was 
represented by Jeffrey L. Shields and Steven L. Tyler; Robert E. 
Wilcox, the Commissioner of Insurance of the state of Utah and 
liquidator of Southern American "insurance Company was represented 
by Brent D. Wride and Rick L. Rose; Peak Investments, Inc. was 
represented by Michael R. Carlston, Kim R. Wilson and Ryan E. 
Tibbitts. 
The Court having heard the evidence and arguments of 
counsel, having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties, 
EXHIBIT "F" ^ 
^ 00171 ?'6 
and other pertinent law, and being fully advised in the premises, 
made its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record 
which are incorporated herein and adopted by this reference. 
Based upon those findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is 
Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed as follows: 
1. The sale to Golfland is not a sale which has been 
approved by the Court, and that sale is, therefore, not 
authorized, 
2. The major changes in the terms of the sale did not give 
the bidders a fair opportunity to bid at the sale and the notice 
and further proceedings did not give the Court an opportunity to 
make a reasoned decision about whether or not to approve the sale 
and other parties an opportunity to properly object. 
3. The Order Approving Sale of Property Free and Clear of 
Liens, Interests and Encumbrances dated March 31, 1994, is hereby 
set aside. 
4- The Debtor is ordered not to proceed with a final sale 
of the water park property without further order of the Court. 
DATED this (p day of July, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
-.'
 7
-T 
'...ED 
61994 . & en E. Clark, United States Bankruptcy Judge 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, JUNE 6, 1994f 2:00 P.M. 
2 PROCEEDINGS. 
3 THE CLERK: This is in the matter of BCD. 
4 THE COURT: Will counsel note your appearance. 
5 MR. CARLSTON: Michael Carlston and Ryan Tibbetts 
6 for Peak Investment. 
7 MS. LYMAN: Mona Lyman and Bill Thurman on behalf 
8 of the debtor. 
9 MR. ROSE: Rick Rose on behalf of Southern 
10 American Insurance Company in liquidation. 
11 MR. SHIELDS: Jeffrey L. Shields on behalf of 
12 Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. 
13 THE COURT: As I understand it the Court has 
14 allocated for closing arguments up to 4 0 minutes per side. We 
15 will be timing that. Mr. Carlston, you may begin. 
16 MR. SHIELDS: Your Honor, I had just one 
17 procedural matter. I realized I had neglected to move for 
18 admission of GE-11 through GE-23. I would so move at this 
19 time. 
20 MR. CARLSTON: Your Honor, subject to my earlier 
21 objection, which was primarily wasted on duplication, and on 
22 the additional qualification relating to certain of those 
23 exhibits,' that they contain information that was not really 
24 offered for the truth of the matter presented, I would not 
25 object to the admission of the exhibits. 
00400 
1 came to the court with. I didn't hear one thing from them 
2 explaining how they could justify this allocation in a way 
3 that deprives BCD of a hundred and thirteen thousand that 
4 ought to be in it. I didn't hear anything at all about the 
5 other conditions. 
6 We submit, Your Honor, that it's appropriate to set 
7 this aside and warrant Peak to have other bidding take place, 
8 and the fact there's some complications from it isn't a 
9 justification for not doing it when the integrity of the 
10 process is called into being in such a primary way by the way 
11 they've acted. 
12 I submit it. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you* The court will attempt to 
14 rule on the record sooner rather than later this afternoon. 
15 (Whereupon, a brief recess was held.) 
16 THE COURT: The court has heard the evidence and 
17 the arguments of counsel and reviewed the pertinent law, and 
18 will now make its findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
19 the record. 
20 The chronology here is important. On December 22nd, 
21 1993, the debtor filed a motion to approve a sale. It had 
22 received and accepted, subject to court approval, an offer 
23 from B&B Properties to purchase the water park of the debtor 
24 and two adjacent properties for $1,950,000 subject to higher 
25 and better offers presented in writing two days before a 
56 
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hearing on the motion. 
On February 22nd, one day prior to a hearing, 
having received written offers from Peak, Golfland, and 
University Properties, the debtor and the other sellers 
determined to conduct an auction and gave bidders 
approximately two hours notice thereof. 
All of the written offers track the B&B offer 
except that of University which waived nearly all of the 
conditions. 
At the auction University agreed that that included 
most of paragraph 5 of the B&B offer. Everyone at the offer 
believed that the risk of environmental problems on the 
property being purchased was thereby shifted to the buyer. 
Golfland submitted the highest bid at the auction. 
On February 23rd there was a hearing before this 
court in both the BCD and the CDX cases. The sellers asked 
the court to approve the Golfland bid, and the Peak bid as a 
backup bid. 
Thereafter, a dispute arose between the sellers and 
Golfland about the terms of the sale. The sellers egreed to 
make the following concessions to Golfland. Among others they 
were that the sellers would bear up to $200,000 of the costs 
of environmental remediation and one half of a $33,000 bond, 
which had been filed to meet the requirements of the City of 
Provo. 
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On March 2 8th an order approving the sale to 
Golfland was presented to the court by the debtor and signed 
by the court on March 31st. 
The mailing certificate prepared by the sellers and 
attached to that order did not include Peak. At the time of 
the hearing Peak was not advised of the concessions or the 
disputes. The court knew nothing about the concessions or the 
disputes until after the order was signed. 
Mr. Monson, the attorney documenting the 
transaction for the sellers, wanted to attach to the order a 
document showing what the offer was, but because the parties 
couldn't agree just referred to the offer made at the sale. 
This factual situation prompted the court to 
inquire of the parties whether an oral auction could ever be 
conducted subject to higher and better offers. Upon the 
court's — upon consideration of this matter the court 
believes that it can because the parties are obligated to 
give notice to the court, including all of the terms of the 
auction, and the parties who are affected thereby are able to 
come to the court and argue as to what offer was actually a 
better offer. 
In this case the terms were not disclosed to the 
court. The terms that the parties thought they were 
bargaining on and bidding on turn out not to be the terms of 
the sale which is ultimately proposed to the court. The court 
58 
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didn't have the opportunity to give that vital protection 
because the court didn't have the information that it needed. 
The parties didn't have the information they needed to make 
appropriate objections and arguments. That part of the notice 
and hearing requirement for the sale of property simply was 
not met. 
The buyer and the debtor argue about the importance 
of the finality of the sale, and the court certainly agrees 
that that is very important, and it is important. Its 
importance is illustrated here. 
The sale in question before the court has not been 
consummated. The terms of that sale were first brought to the 
attention of this court in connection with this hearing. They 
weren't brought to the attention of this court in connection 
with any prior hearing. Although the debtor in the shoes of 
the Trustee needs some flexibility, the major change in the 
terms of this sale simply did not give the bidders a fair 
opportunity to bid at the sale. The notice did not give the 
court an opportunity to make a reasoned decision about 
whether or not to approve the sale. 
The court notes that the order with respect to both 
the sale to Golfland and the sale to Peak was permissive. 
That permission having been given, any change of the terms 
should have been noticed and brought to the attention of the 
court to rule upon. That did not happen. 
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It is argued that the parties are before the wrong 
court being in this case before this case in BCD. The | 
i 
hearing, however, was in both the BCD and the CDX cases. It j 
is clear that the property being sold out of the BCD estate 
is the lead property of the three properties being sold. The 
CDX order, like the BCD order, is permissive. 
Although this court at this time is not able to 
rule in the other two cases, it did rule in the BCD case with 
respect to the water park property and can rule in the motion 
before it with respect to that property. 
The court finds that the sale proposed to Golfland 
is not a sale which has been approved by the court, and that 
the sale is, therefore, not authorized. 
The debtor asks for some direction from the court. 
The debtor in the first instance has the responsibility to 
design an appropriate sale and ask the court to approve that 
design or to proceed with it. But ultimately it has the 
responsibility to ask the court to approve what it's done to 
make its sale only subject to notice and approval by the 
court. That's what the debtor needs to do in order to have an 
effective sale in this case. 
Therefore, the debtor is ordered not to proceed 
without further order of the court with a final sale of the 
water park property. 
Mr. Caxlston, you may prepare an order consistent 
60 
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with these findings and conclusions. 
MR. CARLSTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Court is in recess. 
(Whereupon, court was held in recess at 4:25.) 
*** 
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at the time and place set forth herein and were taken down by 
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under my direction and supervision: 
That the foregoing pages contain a true and correct 
transcription of my shorthand notes so taken. . 
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